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I. Introduction
One of the central predictions of growth theory, old and new, is that income taxes have a negative effect on the pace of economic expansion. In the Cass-Koopmans version of the neoclassical model and in the Lucas (1988) model, a higher income tax rate reduces the steady-state ratio of physical capital to effective labor and leads to a temporary decline in the rate of growth. In the 'lab-equipment model' of Romer and Rivera-Batiz (1991) and In the models of Jones and Manuelli (1990) and Rebelo (1991) , increases in income taxes lead to permanent declines in the rate of economic expansion. 1 While the study of the effects of taxation in growth models continues to be an extremely active research area, there is little empirical work on this topic. This scarcity of empirical work is due to the difficulties involved in measuring the relevant marginal tax rates.
In this paper we experiment with a method of obtaining average marginal income tax rates that combines information on statutory rates with the amount of tax revenue collected and with data on income distribution. We apply this method to the countries included in Sicat and Virmani's (1988) summary of statutory income tax rates for 1984. The Sicat-Virmani data set includes fifty developing countries and three industrialized economies: the U.S., Japan and Ireland. Our sample includes only 32 countries due to the scarcity of data on income distribution and on the amount of income tax revenue collected in 1984.
In the next section we discuss the prediction that the rate of growth is negatively related to an average marginal tax rate on income. In section III we describe our method for computing average marginal tax rates and present our estimates of marginal tax rates.
A final section provides some conclusion.
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II. Income Taxation in the Linear Growth Model
The effects of income taxation on economic growth can be easily described
In the context of a simple 'AK' model. In this model there is a single sector whose output (Yt) is a linear function of a comprehensive measure of the capital stock, which encompasses both physical and human capital (kt): yt = Akt.
Households have identical preferences, defined over consumption (ct) sequences:
p>O, e>0
(1) An household with income y pays taxes according to the non-linear tax schedule l(y). r(y) is not the statutory tax schedule but is the 'true' tax schedule faced by the household, after taking into account deductions and credits that increase with the income level as well as opportunities for tax avoidance and tax evasion.
The non-linearities in the tax schedule complicate the model to the point where the growth rate of income cannot be computed with pencil-and-paper methods. For this reason we will focus on the growth rate of consumption which is analytically more tractable.
The optimal growth rate of consumption for a household with pre-tax income y is a function of T'(y), the marginal tax rate for that household:
The growth rate of per-capita consumption is:
In this expression c(y) is the optimal level of consumption chosen by an household with pre-tax income y, while C is the level of per capita consumption in the economy: C = IfW(y)c(y)dy. Equation (3) describes the rate 0 of growth at time t, not the steady state growth rate. At present, little is known about the dynamics of models with non-linear income tax schedules.
Substituting gc(y) from (2) in equation (3) it is easy to see that the growth rate of per capita consumption depends in a familiar fashion on the real Interest rate (A), on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (1/6), and on the pure rate of time preference (p):
The new determinant of the rate of consumption expansion introduced by income taxation is the consumption-weighted average of marginal tax rates:
c
~~0
This average marginal tax rate can in principle be computed using the data from income and expenditure surveys that are available for different countries. Unfortunately, we have been unable so far to obtain the breakdown of consumption by income classes that is needed to compute 0C.2 20ne alternative strategy for calculating a consumption-weighted marginal tax rate would be to compute numerically the policy function c(y) for given values
In the next section, we focus on the average marginal tax rate which can be computed with the data that Is currently available--the Income-weighted average marginal tax rate:
where Y denotes per capita income defined as: Y -W 0(y) y dy.
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III. Computiaig an average marginal tax rate
The average marginal tax rate can be computed using individual data on incomes and associated taxes, as in Barro and Sahasakul (1983,1986) and In Gouveia and Strauss (1992) . Unfortunately, due to the unavailability of data, there are no studies of this type for countries other than the U.S.
Our method for computing Q makes use of all the information on income taxation that may be obtainable for a broad set of countries: income distribution data, statutory tax rates and information on the amount of revenue collected.
The key assumption that underlies our method for computing Cy is that the marginal tax rate schedule has a logistic functional form:
This function implies that the marginal tax rate takes values between two thresholds: a /(1+aI) (the lowest rate) and a (the highest rate). For each of A, 0 and p, and of the parameters of the functional form that describes the tax schedule x(y).
country we set ao equal to the highest, statutory rate for 1984 reported by Sicat and Virmani (1988) . We experimented with two procedures for computing a 1 .
The first procedure involves choosing a so that a /(l+a ) coincides
with the lowest statutory rate reported in Sicat and Virmani (1988) . This assumes that there is no tax evasion associated with the first dollar of income earned. Thus it rules out situations in which, by tax evasion or avoidance, it is possible to shelter a fraction a of all income earned (in this case ao/(l+a ) should be equal to a fraction a of the lowest statutory rate). When we applied this method we found that about two thirds of the countries in our sample generated less revenue than the one that would be collected by implementing a linear tax with a rate that coincides with the lowest statutory rate. To avoid excluding these countries from the sample we divided iteratively the lowest statutory rate by 2 until our algorithm to choose a2 (described below) converged.
The second procedure involves ignoring the information on the lowest statutory rate and simply setting a to zero, so that ao/(l+a )=0.3 The two methods produce similar values for the simple average of marginal tax rates, but the second method produces significantly higher income-weighted marginal tax rates. However, the correlation between the income-weighted average marginal tax rates obtained under the two methods is extremely high: 93%.
Defining y as the Income threshold that corresponds to zero taxation (i.e. the value y such that T(y) = 0), we can write the tax schedule implied by equation (7) as:
T(y) = aoy + (a 0 /a 2 ) log(l + a, exp(-a 2 y)] + a3 for y > y
T(y) = 0 for y < y 3 For computational reasons we set ao/(l+al) equal to 0.001.
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The information reported in Sicat and Virmani (1988) for the income threshold that corresponds to zero income tax was used to choose a3.
Finally, the parameter a2 in equations (7) and (8) This revenue consistency requirement allows us to correct the statutory tax schedule to account for tax avoidance and tax evasion as well as for deductions and credits. This requirement Implies that countries that have high statutory schedules but collect very little revenue have a r(y) schedule that is close to the low tax rate for the levels of income where there is significant probability mass.
Using the amount of revenue collected to choose the shape of the tax function is likely to underestimate the distortions caused by taxation; it is possible to significantly distort behavior while generating little revenue.
An extreme example of this bias would be present if the income tax schedule entailed two tax rates, a zero tax rate for Incomes up to y and a 100% 0 marginal tax rate for incomes above y .
With this tax system it would be unlikely to observe Incomes above y ; the tax collected would be zero and our method would produce a zero average marginal tax rate. However, this tax system is far from being distortion free: the relevant marginal tax rate, for households with income y is 100%. This bias toward underestimating tax distortions is likely to-be small when governments are rational. Optimizing governments will avoid tax schedules that generate large distortions but little revenue.
To implement the revenue consistency condition in equation (9) we need to know the Income p.d.f. 0(y). We assumed that income follows a log-normal distribution: 5
(2n) Y where p and a are, respectively, the mean and variance of log(y).6
For each country the parameter o-was chosen to be the one that minimizes the sum of the absolute differences between the empirical Lorenz curve and the theoretical Lorenz curve implied by the lognormaL distribution:
In this equation £(x), represents the fraction of aggregate income held by the poorest x% of the population, N(.)
is the cumulative normal distribution and N-1 (.) its inverse. 7 All calculations were carried out by 5Instead of fitting a continuous distribution, such as the lognormal, we could alternatively use the discrete distribution that Is implicit in the Lorenz curve. 6 The widespread use of the lognormal p.d.f to describe the distribution of income is justified by Its convenient properties (summarized in Aitchison and Brown (1969) ) and by the fact that it is the ergodic distribution of an economy with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks to income (Champernowne (1953) ). The lognormal distribution tends, however, to be rejected in large samples and to be outperformed by the Singh-Maddala and the gamma distribution (see McDonald (1984) and McDonald and Ransom (1979)) . Given the high level of aggregation of our data it Is however unlikely to be worthwhile to consider more complex density functions. 7 The value of a could alternatively have been chosen by using data on the Gini coefficient (GC) together with the fact that the lognormal distribution implies the following relation between 0 and the Gini coefficient (see 7 using Lorenz curves expressed in terms of quintiles and of the upper decile.
Our income distribution data was obtained from the World Bank data base with the exception of data for Zimbabwe, Chile, Mexico and Tunisia, which we extracted from Jain (1975) , and data for Portugal, which we obtained from Gouveia and Tavares (1992) . While the Lorenz curves used for our calculations should correspond to pre-tax income, our data sources fail to ln:icate whether they correspond to pre-tax or after-tax income. 8 We followed Sicat and Virmani (1988) in assuming that the income tax is paid at the level of the household and that each household has 5 members. The value of 1s was chosen so that the mean value of y coincides with household income, using the fact that the mean of income is equal to exp[l4+(1/2)o2 ].
Household Income was computed as five times personal Income, which is the income concept reported in the National Income Accounts that is closest to the Income tax base. The income tax base in the sample used by Gouveia and Strauss (1992) in their estimation of U.S. marginal tax rates represents on average, from 1979 to 1987, 81% of personal income. 9 In countries for which there is no personal income data, we extrapolated the ratio of personal income in GDP by running a regression of this ratio on the Summers and Heston (1990) purchasing-parity-power-adjusted real income in 1980.10 Improving on this Aitchison and Brown (1969) Park (1992) for a detailed discussion of the differences between personal income and adjusted gross income. 10 We used 30 a sample of observations, which Included mostly OECD countries. The regression results were (t-statistics in parenthesis): Personal 8 extrapolation procedure would greatly enhance the quality of our tax rate estimates.
The value of u allows us to calculate a2 using the revenue consistency requirement and proceed to compute the marginal tax schedule, as well as its income-weighted average Ql. Table 1 summarizes some of the information used to produce our marginal tax rate estimates: T (the estimate of the standard deviation of log(y)), the fraction of personal income in GDP (countries for which this number was extrapolated are marked with an (e)), the lowest and highest statutory tax rate, the income threshold y, and the revenue collected (both expressed as a fraction of personal income). Table 2 reports our estimates for the simple and income-weighted marginal tax rate computed using the two methods for choosing a, described before. Column 3 of this table reports the value of the lowest effective rate (a /(l+a1)) adopted as a fraction of the lowest statutory rate. The measures of income-weighted marginal tax rates reported
In Columns (2) and (5) of Table 2 are depicted In Figure 1 . In Figure 2 we compare the marginal tax rates reported in Column 5 with the ratio between revenue and personal income. The correlation between these two series is .95.
Our marginal income tax rate estimates are closest in spirit to the 'effective tax rates' computed by Gouveia and Strauss (1992) by regressing individual taxes on individual incomes, using a non-linear functional form suggested by the equal sacrifice theory of taxation. Our estimates for the U.S. (12% for the simple average and 24% for the income-weighted average) are higher than their estimates for 1984 (14% for the simple average and and 18%
for the income-weighted average) but lower than Barro and Sahasakul's (1986) income-weighted marginal tax estimate for 1983: 27.2%.11 The Barro-Sahasakul Income/GDP = 0.23 + 0.07xSummers-Heston GDP. The R 2 of this regression is As a test of the results produced by our method we multiplied the U.S.
personal income by 81% (the ratio of the income tax base to personal income in the Gouveia-Strauss (1992) sample), choosing ao/(i+a 1 ) to be equal to the lowest statutory rate (0.11). We obtained estimates for the simple and income-weighted average marginal rates of 14% and 17%, respectively. These estimates turn out to be remarkably close to the ones obtained by Gouvela and Strauss (1992): 14% and 18%, respectively. Partly for this reason, we view the estimates reported in columns (4) and (5) (which use information on the lowest statutory rate) as the most plausible.
As we would expect, there is a positive correlation between our incomeweighted average marginal tax rates and the level of real per capita income.
This simply reflects the fact that developed economies tend to rely more on income taxes than less developed countries.
Even though our marginal tax rate estimates are very preliminary we average our two measures of marginal lncome tax rates, reported in columns (2) and (5). In fact, probably as a result of the extremely small number of observations, we could not reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on all the regressors In the equation are zero. It is clearly essential to enlarge the sample before proceeding with an in-depth cross-section study.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper we computed average marginal tax rates for various countries combining information on statutory rates as well as data on income distribution and on the amount of income tax revenue collected. Our method relies heavily of the assumption that the marginal tax schedule has a logistic form. Despite this handicap, we hope that our method stands a better chance of measuring the relevant average marginal tax rate than the widely used alternative of assuming (implicitly or explicitly) that the income tax is proportional.
Our estimates of average marginal tax rates can be significantly improved, both in terms of country coverage and in terms of the quality of the underlying data. The number of countries in our sample can be significantly enlarged by collecting data on the statutory income tax schedules of the OECD countries that were excluded from the Sicat-Virmani (1988) study. One avenue for improving the quality of our estimates involves improving the personal 1 2 We used the least squares growth rate instead of the mean geometric growth rate in light of Watson's (1992) finding that the first estimator is robust to the presence of errors of I(1) or I(O) form. 
